Since the time of Denning's 2 model for the intrusion detection system (IDS), the system that laid the basis for most modern IDSes, intrusion detection technologies have grown in both complexity and sophistication. Yet challenges related to accuracy, management, and the detection of new attacks abound. This work focuses on the management issue. Specifically, it addresses the problem of determining the enabled and disabled states of rules in a rule-based IDS. Knowing the state of a rule in this regard is important because a rule-based IDS can detect a particular event only if it has a rule to detect that event and that rule is enabled. This work develops an algorithm to monitor the enabled/disabled state of rules of a signature based IDS. Given a particular action that a rule would execute when invoked, the algorithm proceeds as follows: (1) it searches through each of the rule sets (sets of rules having similar characteristics) for rules bearing the given action, (2) for each such rule, it determines whether that rule is enabled or disabled, and (3) for each rule set, it reports the total number of enabled and disabled rules, and creates two files containing the line numbers from the rule set where each enabled and disabled rule, respectively, could be found. The algorithm is implemented in Python and is ran against Snort as a test case. Statistical results were obtained and the following are some of the findings: (a) the vast majority of rules are inactive by default, (b) of all the actions that could be taken when a rule is invoked, the ALERT action far outpaced its counterparts, and (c) from the rule versions that were examined, it was found that the number of rules are growing significantly.
Introduction
In recent years, intrusion detection technologies have grown in both complexity and sophistication 1, 8, 19 . Yet challenges related to accuracy, management, and the detection of new attacks abound. This work focuses on the management issue. Specifically, it develops an algorithm to monitor the on (enable) and off (disable) state of rules in rule-based IDSes, and reports the related statistical findings. Hence, in the context of this paper, management means the monitoring and reporting of the enabled and disabled state of rules.
To elucidate the discussion, we provide definitions of a few IDS key terms. These terms are adopted from NIST Special Publication 800-94 14 . It describes intrusion detection as the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analysing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. An IDS is described as a software application that automates the intrusion detection process. An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is a software application that has all the capabilities of an intrusion detection system, but can also attempt to stop possible incidents. For brevity, the term intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) is sometimes used to refer to both IDS and IPS. We shall adopt that convention here.
Modern IDPSes usually employ one of three detection methodologies to detect incidences: signature based, anomaly based, and stateful protocol analysis 14 . A signature is a pattern that corresponds to a known threat. Signature (or rule) based detection is the process of comparing signatures against observed events to identify possible incidents. Rules contain the information that enable the IDS to take a specific action (such as, sending an alert, blocking an attack or dropping offending packets), should a potential malicious event present itself. Rule based systems are the most widely deployed IDPSes and perform best when the signature information is accurate, and the rules derived from them are precisely constructed by an expert. However, as new attacks are discovered and software systems change, some existing rules become irrelevant and construction of new rules become necessary. Indeed, over the past few years, attacks have increased at an alarming rate, raising concerns in both the private and public sectors 9, 4 . In an effort to keep pace with attacks and threats, the number of rules has similarly increased, including in some of the most popularly used signature based systems, such as Snort 11 , Network Flight Recorder (NFR) 5 , RealSecure 20 and Dragon 13 . In turn, researchers are developing ways of automating the rule management process. For example, Stakhanova and Ghorbani 17 developed a method to discover inconsistencies within rules, and Stakhanova et al. 18 developed a method to discover conflicts within rules. Another issue is the timely creation of rules 6 . Since rule creation is still a manual process, there will usually be a varying lag between discovery of an attack and the creation of a rule to take some defensive action, should that attack present itself again. Thus, automatic creation of rules is an active area of research 6, 3, 12 . Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of signature based systems is their ineffectiveness against zero-day attacks (unknown attacks, occurring for the first time) 7 . Anomaly-based detection is the process of comparing definitions of what activity is considered normal against observed events to identify significant deviations 14 . Stateful protocol analysis is the process of comparing predetermined profiles of generally accepted definitions of benign protocol activity for each protocol state against observed events to identify deviations.
This work focuses on signature-based detection and the issue of monitoring the enabled/disabled state in a rule based IDS. Upon the initial install of rules in a rule based system, such as Snort 11 , there will be a set of rules with a default state of enabled; all others will be disabled. This is so for a variety of reasons, including: (1) some rules are network dependent; and (2) signature based systems are computationally intensive and become more so as the number of rules in that enabled grow. However, when a rule is disabled, the IDS is unable to detect attacks that the rule was defined to detect. Once an IDS is installed, the responsibility for maintaining it is usually assigned to the busy system administrator. The administrator must determine the current enabled/disabled state of rules, and what additional rules should be enabled based on the needs of the network. If rules are inadvertently or maliciously disabled, the administrator needs to know so that appropriate actions can be taken. Thus, information, such as total number of rules, how many, and what rules are enabled or disabled can be helpful in increasing the administrator's effectiveness in managing rules and hence improving the overall effectiveness of an IDS. This work develops an algorithm with the capability to monitor the enabled or disabled state of rules, and record the number of rules in each such state and their location. The algorithm also provides periodic updates on the enabled/disabled state of rules. Finally, it is implemented in Python, ran against Snort IDS, and statistical findings are reported.
Methods
Stakhanova et al. 18 define an intrusion detection rule as a tuple ( , ) This rule sends an alert if the packet is a TCP packet originating from any IP address and any port, and destined to port 111 of the internal network 192.168.1.0/24. In Snort jargon, the text up to the left parenthesis is called the rule header. The section enclosed in the parentheses contains the rule options. The words before the colons in the rule options section are called option keywords (or just options). The action, 1 A , in this example is ALERT. ALERT is simply one among eight actions that Snort could take when it encounters an event deemed suspicious by its rule base. The complete list is as follows:
ALERT -Generate an alert using the selected ALERT method, and then log the packet LOG -Log the packet PASS -Ignore the packet ACTIVATE -Alert and then turn on another dynamic rule DYNAMIC -Remain idle until activated by an activate rule , then act as a log rule DROP -Block and log the packet REJECT -Block the packet, log it, and then send a TCP reset if the protocol is TCP or an ICMP port unreachable message if the protocol is UDP SDROP -Block the packet but do not log it. The Snort rule, R1, can be cast in the general language used for a rule in the following way:
If protocol=tcp source_ip=any source_port=any destination_ip 192.168.1.0/24 destination_port=111 content:"|00 01 86 a5|" Alert
We define a rule set as a file consisting of a set (or category) of rules that share a common set of characteristics.
Since an IDPS typically uses multiple rule sets, we denote a rule set by , i S and assume that there are m such rule sets. Also, we introduce a second subscript in the notation for the rule to denote it as i j R . Further, it is assumed that each rule set contains i n rules 1 2 , ,..., m so as to identify the state of each rule in each rule set, in terms of whether it is enabled or disabled, and to build useful statistics based on these findings. The algorithm should also provide periodic updates of this information. This may be accomplished by running it as a daemon with an appropriately selected specified period. We call the algorithm Rule Status Monitoring Algorithm (RSMA). It is given as follows: Snort provides two sets of rules; one is for paid subscribers, the other is for registered users. The rule sets for registered users is a 30-day delayed feed of the rules provided to subscribers. Snort rules are provided under a license that prohibits their commercial re-use; see https://www.snort.org/license for complete details. A third set of rules, the Community Snort Rules, is freely available to all Snort users. Rule sets are available at the Snort website, https://www.snort.org/downloads. Our experimental work concentrated on the rules for registered users only. Rule set files are archived in a tar.gz format.
When a particular archived rule sets file (e.g., snortrules-snapshot-2983.tar.gz) is extracted with the command tar zxvf snortrules-snapshot-29xx.tar.gz, the following four folders are created: etc, preproc_rules, rules and so_rules. The folder, etc, consists of configuration files, and preproc_rules consists of preprocessing rules. The rules folder consists of rules written in regular Snort rule language. The directory, so_rules, consists of shared object rules. Shared Object rule language is essentially like the C language. These rules allow for detections that are not possible under regular Snort rule language and allow for obfuscation of exact detection. The rule set's name is usually indicative of the kinds of rules that it possesses. The deleted.rules rule set, for example, consists of the set of rules that have become obsolete and are no longer in use.
We ran RSMA with the rules directory as input for each of the following five rule versions: 2.9.7.0, 2.9.7.6, 2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 2.9.8.3, respectively. Rules in Snort are disabled when they are preceded by the hash symbol, #. Absence of this symbol means that the rule is enabled. The number of rule sets in the rules directory can be determined by typing the command ls | wc -l at the terminal within that directory. It was found that there were 118 rule sets in this folder. Their names are provided in Table 1 . Given a particular rule action, the algorithm searches through each of the rule sets in Table 1 to determine which rules were enable/disable state and the total of each. The results are presented in Table 2 . Enabled and disabled states for versions 2.9.7.6, 2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 2.9.8.3 were found to be the same. However, these differed, sometimes markedly, with version 2.9.7.0. Thus, Table  2 compares enable and disabled states of version 2.9.7.0 with version 2.9.8.3 only. The table shows that the ALERT action was the most frequently implemented action (37,566 for version 2.9.7.0 and 45,862 for version 2.9.8.3). In going from version 2.9.7.0 to version 2.9.8.3, we found that there was a 32% increase in the number of rules. Generally, it was found that the majority of rules were disabled; 87% in each of the versions examined. The REJECT and SDROP action were implemented by one rule each, both of which were disabled by default. Fig. 1 is a plot of rule set index as given in Table 1 (abscissa) versus the number of individual rules invoking the ALERT action for the corresponding rule set (ordinate). It is seen that the delete.rules rule set contains the most rules (9, 194) , followed by the malware-cnc.rules rule set (5125). Snort does not delete rules, but moves them to the delete.rules rule set when they are no longer useful. All of the rules in the delete.rules rule set should be disabled. To gain a deeper understanding of the data, the tool, Weka 22 , was employed to study some of the statistical properties of the data and to examine whether any hidden patterns existed in it. Weka is a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks 23 . A probability-based clustering algorithm was used to attempt to detect hidden meaning in the data. From a probabilistic perspective, the goal of clustering is to find the most likely set of clusters given a specific data set. The algorithm employed Gaussian mixture modeling and used the EM (expectation maximization) algorithm to estimate the Gaussian parameters.
For the clustering experiment, the data consists of eight columns, each representing a different Snort rule action (i.e., a field). Each row represents one of the 118 rule sets. Hence, a value in a row represents the number of rules in the corresponding rule set that invoke the action in the corresponding column. 66% of the data was used for training, and the remainder for testing. The results are provided in Figure 2 . They show that rules can belong to one of two clusters. We call these Cluster 0 and Cluster 1, and for convenience, we flip cluster names for the Version 2.9.8.3 results (left subfigure). For the two rule versions we considered-versions 2.9.7.0 and 2.9.8.3--a rule has an 83% chance of appearing in Cluster 0 and 17% chance of appearing in Cluster 1. With respect to the action they invoke, generally, Cluster 0 rules tend to have significantly higher means and standard deviations than Cluster 1 rules.
Conclusion
This work developed an algorithm to monitor the enable/disable states of rules in a signature based IDPS. The algorithm was implemented in Python and, as a test case, it was executed with Snort rules as input. Five different Snort rule versions were used: versions 2.9.7.0, 2.9.7.6, 2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 2.9.8.3. We found the results for the latter four versions to be the same. However, they differed from the version 2.9.7.0 rules. It was found that the Snort rules folder consisted of 118 rulesets across all versions. Further, the ALERT action was the most frequently used rule action, with a total of 45,862 rules using this action in the version 2.9.8.3 release and 37,566 for version 2.9.7.0. In going from version 2.9.7.0 to version 2.9.8.3, there was a 32% increase in the number of rules. We found generally that the majority of rules were disabled (87% in all rule versions). The REJECT and SDROP action were implemented by one rule each, both of which were disabled by default. Thus most of the rules by default are preset to disabled and, thus, may not provide adequate protection. To increase the level of protection offered by the Snort IDS, a user would need to conduct a thorough review and judicious enabling of rules when a system is first activated. In a future work, we plan to expand our study to other rule sets and to other signature based systems. In the current implementation, comparisons to determine changes in rules enable/disable state when the algorithm is executed at different times, must be done manually. We plan to automate this process in a future work. Finally, we plan to also gather statistics on the dynamic behavior of both enabled and disabled rules.
